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ESSAY
THEORIZING YES:
AN ESSAY ON FEMINISM, LAW, AND DESIRE
Katherine M. Franke*
In this Essay, Professor Franke observes that, unlike feminists from other
disciplines, feminist legal theorists have neglected to formulate a positive the-
ory of female sexuality. Instead, discussions of female sexuality have been
framed as either a matter of dependency or danger. Professor Franke begins
her challenge to this scheme by asking why legal feminism has accepted un-
questionably the fact that most women reproduce in their lifetimes. Why have
not social forces that incentivize motherhood-a dynamic she terms repro-
normativity-been exposed to as exacting a feminist critique as have hetero-
normative forces that normalize heterosexuality? Furthermore, she continues
by noting that when feminist legal theory renders sex as dangerous, such
analysis risks advancing the view that the only acceptable answer to any
sexual proposition is "no." Professor Franke cautions that the willingness of
most legal feminists to maternalize uncritically the female subject or to con-
ceptualize sex as the inevitable site of danger for women, effectively marginal-
izes, if not erases, the possibility of non-reproductive female sexual desire and
pleasure.
Legal feminism is by no means a discipline autonomous from a
larger set of conversations self-identified as feminist in nature. Indeed,
we, the legal feminists, regard ourselves as concerned with issues that are
central to a broader intellectual and political feminist movement: sex-
based equality in the workplace, reproductive rights, domestic violence,
the needs of working mothers, sexual harassment, and rape, to name only
a few such issues, figure centrally in feminist theory-legal and otherwise.
Yet, there appears to be an increasing disconnect between legal feminism
and other feminist disciplines when it comes to the scope and meaning of
a feminist approach to sexuality, desire, and women's "hedonic lives," to
borrow a term Robin West introduced into the legal literature some years
ago.' Without a doubt, when it comes to sex, we have done a more than
adequate job of theorizing the right to say no, but we have left to others
the task of understanding what it might mean to say yes. However, as
Carole Vance has reminded us for over twenty years, a feminist approach
to sexual matters must "simultaneously ... reduce the dangers women
* Professor of Law, Columbia University. My thanks to Wendy Brown, Alexandra
Chasin, Lisa Duggan, Martha Ertman, Renoe R6mkens, Carol Rose, Carol Sanger, and
Carole Vance for their thoughtful comments on earlier versions of this Essay. Particular
thanks to Kari Hong for her excellent editorial assistance with this Essay.
1. Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological
Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 Wis. Women's L.J. 81, 81 (1987).
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face and ... expand the possibilities, opportunities, and permissions for
pleasure that are open to them." 2
In this Essay I will ask a set of questions intended to highlight the
degree to which legal feminism has, by and large, reduced questions of
sexuality to two principal concerns for women: dependency, and the re-
sponsibilities that motherhood entails, and danger, such as sexual harass-
ment, rape, incest, and domestic violence.3 This concentration on the
elimination of sexual danger and dependency for women risks making
"women's actual experience with pleasure invisible, overstat[ing] danger
until it monopolizes the entire frame, positions women solely as victims,
and fails to empower our movement with women's curiosity, desire, ad-
venture and success."4 Curiously, since the end of the so-called "sex
wars" 5 in the 1980s, it seems that legal feminists have ceded to queer the-
orists the job of imagining the female body as a site of pleasure, intimacy,
and erotic possibility.
While we devote our considerable energies to addressing sexuality
understood in terms of freedom from oppressive practices, feminists in
other disciplines continue to simultaneously approach questions of sexu-
ality in both negative (freedom from) and positive (freedom to) terms.6
Why do legal feminists frame questions of sexuality more narrowly than
our colleagues in other fields? Is there something intrinsic to a legal ap-
proach to sexuality that deprives us of the tools, authority, or expertise to
2. Carole S. Vance, More Danger, More Pleasure: A Decade After the Barnard
Sexuality Conference, 38 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 289, 290 (1993).
3. In their Foreword to a symposium on the Gender, Work & Family Project's
Inaugural Feminist Legal Theory Lecture given by Martha Fineman, Project Co-Directors
Adrienne Davis and Joan Williams identified the "eroticization of dominance" understood
as "the sex/violence axis of gender formation," and "conflict that people experience as
they negotiate between their work lives and their family lives," as the two principal strands
of contemporary feminist legal theory. Adrienne D. Davis &Joan C. Williams, Foreword, 8
Am. U.J. Gender Soc. Pol'y & L. 1, 2-3 (2000).
4. Vance, supra note 2, at 290.
5. See, e.g., Caught Looking: Feminism, Pornography and Censorship 4-8 (Kate Ellis
et al. eds., 1992); Lisa Duggan & Nan D. Hunter, Sex Wars: Sexual Dissent and Political
Culture 1, 30-78 (1995); Alice Echols, Daring To Be Bad: Radical Feminism in America
1967-1975, at 289-91 (1989); Lisa Duggan, The Sex Panic: Women, Censorship, and
"Pornography": An Historical Overview, 38 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 25, 28 (1993); Vance, supra
note 2, at 289.
6. To name only a few, from Cinema Studies, see, e.g., Laura Kipnis, Bound and
Gagged: Pornography and the Politics of Fantasy in America, at x-xi (1996); Laura Kipnis,
Ecstasy Unlimited: On Sex, Capital, Gender, and Aesthetics 8-11 (1993); Laura Kipnis,
Adultery, 24 Critical Inquiry 289, 293 (1998); from Anthropology, see, e.g., Micaela di
Leonardo, Exotics at Home: Anthropologies, Others, American Modernity 326-46 (1998);
The Gender/Sexuality Reader: Culture, History, Political Economy 5-8 (Micaela di
Leonardo ed., 1997); Deborah A. Elliston, Erotic Anthropology: "Ritualized
Homosexuality" in Melanesia and Beyond, 22 Am. Ethnologist 848, 855-56 (1995); from
History, see, e.g., Judith R. Walkowitz, City of Dreadful Delight: Narratives of Sexual
Danger in Late-Victorian London 113-22 (1992); from American Studies, see, e.g., Lauren
Berlant, The Queen of America Goes to Washington City: Essays on Sex and Citizenship 5
(1997). See generally Special Issue on Intimacy, 24 Critical Inquiry (1998).
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address desire head on? Can law protect pleasure? Should it? Or have
legal feminists implicitly made the (I believe mistaken) strategic judge-
ment that feminist legal theory cannot explore sexuality positively until
danger and dependency are first eliminated?
I cannot promise answers to these difficult questions for law and for
feminism. Rather, with this Essay I hope to stimulate a conversation
among legal feminists about our approaches to sexuality, and by asking
some uncomfortable questions, foreground what I believe are unexam-
ined premises in legal feminist approaches to dependency and danger
that could bear more critical attention.
In the discussion that follows, I first examine the two principal man-
ners in which legal feminists tend to approach questions of sexuality: de-
pendency nd danger. I then situate these approaches within a larger
feminist context in which I consider viable future directions for feminist
legal theory in light of the complex interrelationships of sexuality, gen-
der, and desire.
I. THE REPRONORMATIVITY OF MOTHERHOOD
Motherhood and its implications figure centrally in virtually all femi-
nist agendas. However, for much of first and second wave legal feminism,
issues of gender collapse quite quickly into the normative significance of
our roles as mothers. Grounding feminist legal theory in object relations
theory7 and demanding that women's participation in the wage labor
market be compatible with our responsibilities as mothers8 are only two
salient examples of how the legal feminist frame tends to collapse wo-
men's identity into motherhood. The centrality, presumption, and inevi-
tability of our responsibility for children remain a starting point for many,
if not most, legal feminists.9
Consider two propositions: The overwhelming majority of women
are heterosexual. The overwhelming majority of women are mothers.
The degree to which social preferences and prohibitions-otherwise
known as compulsory heterosexuality-contribute to the "fact" stated by
the first proposition has become relatively accepted within feminist, and
certainly queer, theory circles. Feminists have become, to varying de-
grees, sensitive to the technologies of power that steer, suggest, coerce,
and demand that women be heterosexual and that abjection lies in the
refusal of such a demand.
7. See, e.g., Nancy Chodorow, The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and
the Sociology of Gender 11 (1978); Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1, 1 (1988).
8. See, e.g., Joan Williams, Unbending Gender: Why Family and Work Conflict and
What To Do About It, at x (2000).
9. Id. See also Sara Ruddick, Thinking Mothers/Conceiving Birth, in
Representations of Motherhood 29, 36 (Donna Bassin et al. eds., 1994) ("To respect female
bodies means respecting, even treasuring, the birthgiving vulnerabilities and procreative
powers of females.").
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Yet the same cannot be said of the second proposition laid out
above: Most women are mothers. Why is it that we are willing to acknowl-
edge that heteronormative cultural preferences play a significant role in
sexual orientation and selection of sexual partners, while at the same
time refusing to treat repronormative forces as warranting similar theo-
retical attention?1° If you believe the statistics, women are more likely
not to have borne a child in their lifetimes" than to be lesbian.12 Is there
any principled reason why legal feminists might not want to devote some
attention to exposing the complex ways in which reproduction is incen-
tivized and subsidized in ways that may bear upon the life choices women
face? To ask such a question is to risk being labeled unfeminist.13 To
10. To be fair, Dorothy Roberts and Carol Sanger are two legal theorists who have
raised this issue in their work. Roberts has noted the contrast between coercive natalism
for white women and the forces that discourage Black women from procreating. See, e.g.,
Dorothy E. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 209, 239 & nn.118-19 (1995);
Dorothy E. Roberts, Racism and Patriarchy in the Meaning of Motherhood, 1 Am. U. J.
Gender Soc. Pol'y & L. 1, 10-11 (1993); Joan C. Callahan & Dorothy E. Roberts, A
Feminist Social Justice Approach to Reproduction-Assisting Technologies: A Case Study
on the Limits of Liberal Theory, 84 Ky. L.J. 1197, 1225 (1995-1996). Sanger has applied a
similar analysis to other presumptively disfavored mothers. See, e.g., Carol Sanger, M is for
the Many Things, I S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women's Stud. 15, 49-51 (1992) [hereinafter Sanger,
M is for the Many Things]; Carol Sanger, Separating from Children, 96 Colum. L. Rev.
375, 410 (1996); see also Julia E. Hanigsberg, Homologizing Pregnancy and Motherhood:
A Consideration of Abortion, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 371, 417-18 (1995) (calling for
reconceptualizing the abortion decision within the context of mothering decisions").
11. Census data reveals that 19% of women will not have borne a child by their forty-
fourth birthday. Amara Bachu & Martin O'Connell, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Current
Population Reports: Fertility of American Women: June 1998 2 tbl. A (2000). Of course,
women who have not borne children themselves can be and are mothers, whether through
adoption, parenting of their partner's children, or what Patricia Hill Collins calls
"othermothering." Patricia Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge,
Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment 119 (1990).
12. Of course, the validity of statistics regarding the prevalence of lesbians in the
population is vulnerable on a number of fronts: underreporting by lesbians due to
homophobia, difficulty defining the category "lesbian," and the important distinction
between lesbian acts and lesbian identity are among the most prominent. Reports of the
incidence of lesbianism in the U.S. population vary from Kinsey's figure that 13% of
women had reported reaching orgasm with another woman at some point in their lives, to
the National Opinion Research Center's 1992 report entitled "The Social Organization of
Sexuality" that found only 1.3% of women had engaged in "homosexual" activity in the
preceding year. See Alfred C. Kinsey et al., Sexual Behavior in the Human Female 454
(1953); Edward 0. Laumann et al., The Social Organization of Sexuality: Sexual Practices
in the United States 294 (1994). Naomi Mezey has done a nice job of surveying and
critiquing this literature. Naomi Mezey, Dismantling the Wall: Bisexuality and the
Possibilities of Sexual Identity Classification Based on Acts, 10 Berkeley Women's L.J. 98,
104-06 (1995).
13. There is a burgeoning academic and popular literature that raises the question of
"childless by choice." See, e.g., Jane Bartlett, Will You Be Mother?: Women Who Choose
to Say No, at ix (1994);Joan Brady, I Don't Need a Baby To Be Who I Am: Thoughts and
Affirmations on a Fulfilling Life, at xi-xvi, 112-25 (1998); Elinor Burkett, The Baby Boon:
How Family-Friendly America Cheats the Childless 7 (2000); Mardy S. Ireland,
Reconceiving Women: Separating Motherhood from Female Identity, at vii (1993);
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suggest that we reconceptualize procreation as a. cultural preference
rather than a biological imperative, and then explore ways in which to
lessen or at least modify the demand to conform to that preference, is to
initiate a conversation within feminism that has been explicitly and curtly
rejected by some legal feminists. However, it is a conversation that neces-
sarily demands feminist discussants, for only by positing the possibility of
female identity divorced from mothering can we make mothering ethi-
cally and politically intelligible. Surely mothering grounds the lives of
many women, but that ground, once taken for granted, risks obscuring
the figure of woman, whose identity extends beyond her role as mother.
Notwithstanding the prevalence of both childlessness and lesbian-
ism, 1 4 somehow reproduction continues to be regarded as more inevita-
ble and natural than heterosexuality. That is to say, repronormativity re-
mains in the closet even while heteronormativity has stepped more into
the light of the theoretical and political day. Reproduction has been so
taken for granted that only women who are not parents are regarded as
having made a choice-a choice that is constructed as nontraditional,
nonconventional, and for some, non-natural.' 5 In a telling switch, the
Carolyn M. Morell, Unwomanly Conduct The Challenges Of Intentional Childlessness, at
xiii (1994); Martha E. Gimenez, Feminism, Pronatalism, and Motherhood, in Mothering:
Essays in Feminist Theory 287, 299-301 (Joyce Trebilcot ed., 1983); Irene Reti,
Introduction to Childless by Choice: A Feminist Anthology 1-3 (Irene Reti ed., 1992); Lisa
Belkin, Your Kids are Their Problem, N.Y. Times, July 23, 2000, (Magazine), at 30; Enid
Nemy, No Children. No Apologies., N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1995, at C12. By listing these
publications here, I do not mean to endorse the arguments that their authors have made.
In fact, some of these texts I would characterize as proto-, neo-, or anti-feminist in their
approaches, just as I would characterize the work of Naomi Wolf and Katie Roiphe.
Burkett, for instance, raises some interesting concerns for the lay reader regarding the
degree to which parenting is subsidized for middle-class families in public and private ways,
but she does so, seemingly, in complete ignorance of the real burdens and discriminations
that working mothers suffer at home and at work-such as the history and current reality
of losing their jobs when they get pregnant, or losing promotions for sexist reasons. See
Burkett, supra, at 25-61 (describing how workers with children gain substantial benefits in
the workplace). I mention these publications to illustrate what appears to be something of
a growing sentiment among childless workers that their life choices are treated as of
secondary importance when compared with those workers engaged in child-rearing.
14. By setting up the comparison this way, I do not mean to reify the notion that
lesbians do not have children. Of course we do, and in greater numbers each year. Rather
my goal is to expose the degree to which even thoughtful legal feminists persist in the idea
that reproduction is the result of a natural drive not worthy of our critical attention except
when socially discouraged, while sexual orientation is, at least in theory, understood to be
subject to powerful cultural influences.
15. The construction of the woman who chooses not to have children is contrasted
with the woman who desires to, but is unable to bear children. The tragedy of her
predicament reinforces the marginality of the woman who is childless by choice.
Interestingly enough, in a context in which nature has visited a cruel deprivation on the
"barren woman," the woman who chooses not to reproduce is positioned as having made a
choice that violates some natural instinct, order, or destiny. See Callahan & Roberts, supra
note 10, at 1225 ("Our society does not think it is just fine for people to remain single and
childless deliberately or for married people to remain childless deliberately. Infertility is
constructed as a nearly unbearable tragedy; deliberate childlessness is constructed as nearly
2001]
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issue of choice flips for lesbians, who are constructed as choosing mother-
hood, given that lesbians continue to have an identity understood as non-
reproductive in nature. Similarly, the official story of reproduction as a
natural drive is deeply racialized, as women of color have struggled
against social forces that have at times coercively appropriated, and at
other times coercively discouraged their reproduction in numerous ways.
So too, in recent debates over welfare reform, poor mothers have been
vilified for having borne children strategically. 16 While a claim not borne
out by any reliable studies, it has justified the punishment of women who
reproduce for the wrong reasons.' 7
Thus, reproduction raises numerous sticky normative questions, yet
underexplored within feminism, with respect to choice, coercion, and
policies that incentivize and disincentivize reproductive uses of women's
sexual bodies-not only for women who occupy law's margins, such as
lesbians and women of color, but also for women whose reproduction we
regard as unproblematic.
The first objection one hears when one questions the normativity of
reproduction is: "But we must reproduce the species." a8 Certainly this
must be right, but the conversation-stopping power of this natalist objec-
tion should not be overstated.' 9 The fact that the future of the species
depends upon ongoing reproduction 20 does not relieve us from devoting
critical attention to the manners in which this biological demand be-
comes culturally organized. Feminists have undertaken deep and
nuanced critiques of the social and sexual division of labor that devalues
unimaginable selfishness."). This flipping, of structuring the natural as the cultural and
the cultural as the natural, merely illustrates the degree to which nature (here, infertility)
has proven easier to transform than culture (the expectations that women be mothers).
16. Recent welfare reform has portrayed poor women as choosing to reproduce in
order to receive larger welfare grants. See, e.g., Mimi Abramovitz, Under Attack, Fighting
Back: Women and Welfare in the United States 35 (1996); Laura M. Friedman, Comment,
Family Cap and the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine: Scrutinizing a Welfare
Woman's Right to Bear Children, 56 Ohio St. L.J. 637, 657-59 (1995) (discussing various
states' "Family Cap" programs); see also Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 602 (a) (7) (A) (iii) (Supp. III 1997) (allowing
waivers of federal welfare requirements for, inter alia, states that adopt family caps); CK v.
N.J. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 92 F.3d 171, 194-95 (3d Cir. 1996) (upholding New
Jersey Family Cap against constitutional and statutory challenge).
17. See Linda C. McClain, "Irresponsible" Reproduction, 47 Hastings LJ. 339, 352-58
(1996) (analyzing the various manners in which poor women's reproduction is figured as
irresponsible).
18. So responded a prominent feminist philosopher of the family when I raised
concerns about compulsory reproduction at a recent conference.
19. For an interesting discussion of the biological roots of mothering, see generally
Sarah Blaffer Hrdy, Mother Nature: A History of Mothers, Infants, and Natural Selection
146-74 (1999).
20. Issues of world overpopulation and the disproportionate amount of world
resources consumed by Americans make the "we have to reproduce the species" retort a
more complex issue than a mere biological demand. See, e.g., Mona L. Hymel, The
Population Crisis: The Stork, the Plow, and the IRS, 77 N.C. L. Rev. 13, 102-03 (1998).
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reproduction, largely assigns it to women in isolated households, and
then refuses to remunerate it.21 Our response to this oppressive sexual
history must go beyond the mere revaluation of women's reproductive
labor such that the matemalization of female identity remains intact.22
The push to commodify dependency work has been an important
means by which the separate spheres doctrine has been repudiated, but
what has it done for women's sexuality generally? Surely our best strategy
cannot lie in creative efforts to commodify the domain of sexuality that is
the surplus above mere procreation, for it may be that its greatest value
lies precisely in its excess. What might "acts that are not civic acts, like
sex, [have to do with feminist] citizenship"?2 3 Or, as Jennifer Brown re-
cently put it, what are we to make of activities like prayer and orgasm for
which their market value bears little relevance to the value we derive from
them? 24 That is not to say that these activities are of no consumptive or
productive value, but rather that we may prize them for the manner in
which they figure outside of traditional valuations of exchange. "Revolu-
tion must involve heterogeneous expression, wasteful gift exchange (pure
expenditure rather than accumulation, final consumption rather than
productive consumption), and nonprocreative sex."25
Martha Fineman's work is among the most sophisticated attempts to
reconceptualize the practice of motherhood tout court.2 6 She has ob-
served that "[m]otherhood [is] a colonized concept-an event physically
practiced and experienced by women, but occupied and defined, given
21. E.g., Nancy C.M. Hartsock, Money, Sex, and Power 234-40 (1983); Carole
Pateman, The Sexual Contract 116-53 (1988); Mary Jo Frug, Securing Job Equality for
Women: Labor Market Hostility to Working Mothers, 59 B.U. L. Rev. 55, 59 (1979).
22. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 829, 830-31
(1990);Judith Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspirations for Our
Judges, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1877, 1906-28 (1988). For a critical account of the literature, see
Vicki Schultz, Life's Work, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1881, 1899-1907 (2000).
23. Berlant, supra note 6, at 5.
24. Brown writes:
[Ihf we want to talk about what human beings are like, we face the limitations of
any view that divides the world into production and consumption, with no third
way. I think that (probably some, not all) human beings want and even need
some time.., in which they neither produce nor consume, but merely (to put it
in sort of new agey terms) "be," . .. [such as] prayer, meditation, washing dishes
(even when an electric dishwasher in the house could do the job), playing, sex,
orgasm. It may be that each of these activities also has productive or consumptive
properties, but I think that those properties are of secondary importance much of
the time.
E-mail from Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Professor, Quinnipiac College School of Law, to
Katherine Franke, Professor of Law, Columbia University (June 29, 2000, 11:33:59 CST)
(on file with author).
25. MirandaJoseph, The Performance of Production and Consumption, 54 Soc. Text
25, 51 (1998).
26. E.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, The Neutered Mother, The Sexual Family, and
Other Twentieth Century Tragedies (1995) [hereinafter Fineman, Neutered Mother].
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content and value, by the core concepts of patriarchal ideology."27 She
urges us to sever our erotic relationships from our kinship relationships,
pointing out that there is no necessary connection between the erotic
bonds that tie adults to one another and the kinship ties that lash parent
to child. Fineman's most recent work makes the claim that caring for
children is society-preserving work that "produces and reproduces soci-
ety,"28 and which must be done "if a society is to survive and perpetuate
itself."29 These arguments are developed to justify a claim that mothers
are owed a social debt for performing this work.30 Yet at times she too
succumbs to an insufficiently critical reliance upon natalism. The altruis-
tic needs of those who perform this all-important society-preserving work
are, for Fineman, to be distinguished from other selfish lifestyle choices a
person might make and for which they might seek public subsidies-such
as purchasing an expensive sports car.31 Mothering, for Fineman, is so-
cial production worthy of substantial public support, while owning a
Porsche is simple consumption, and therefore merely individual rather
than society-preserving in nature. 32
The normative distinction that sets up the altruism of mothers
against the selfishness of Porsche drivers suffers from several weaknesses,
not the least of which are the confusion between the social effect of a
practice and an individual's motivation for engaging in the practice, 33
and an impoverished account of the meanings of and relationships be-
tween social production, social reproduction, and consumption.
Beginning with Marx, various social theorists have worked hard to
displace oppositions between production and consumption, the eco-
27. Martha A. Fineman, Images of Mothers in Poverty Discourses, 1991 Duke L.J. 274,
289-90.
28. Martha Albertson Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths: Independence,
Autonomy, and Self-Sufficiency, 8 Am. U.J. Gender Soc. Pol'y & L. 13, 19 (2000).
29. Id. at 18.
30. Id. at 16-19.
31. See id. at 21 n.15. Fineman notes:
In particular, I have been struck by two quasi-economic responses to the point
that caretakers should be compensated. I refer to one as the "Porsche
Preference." This argument states that if someone prefers a child, this preference
should not be treated differently than any other choice (like the choice to own a
Porsche). Society should not subsidize either preference. I hope the society-
preserving nature of children helps to distinguish that preference from the whim
of the auto fan.
Id.
32. The framing of the costs of mothering as a privileged form of cultural work, and
as labor that must figure at the center of any feminist project, risks a built-in erasure of, if
not disfavor for, other types of "society-preserving work" that are not repronormative in
nature. Lauren Berlant shares a similar concern with respect to the connection between
production and reproduction for women: "At this time in America, however, the
reproducing woman is no longer cast as a potentially productive citizen, except insofar as
she procreates: her capacity for other kinds of creative agency has become an obstacle to
national reproduction." Berlant, supra note 6, at 100.
33. I must thank Ren&e R6mkens for bringing this distinction to my attention.
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nomic and the social, the individual and the collective. 34 While Fineman,
and many others,3 5 are correct that society reproduces itself through the
process of biological reproduction, this is by no means the only manner
in which social reproduction takes place, nor is it necessarily the most
important. The reproduction of society takes place constantly through
countless reiterative practices, many of which are structured as simultane-
ously productive and consumptive in nature. 36 After all, this was the prin-
cipal strategy of Henry Ford: "What was special about Ford . . . was his
vision, his explicit recognition that mass production meant mass con-
sumption . . . . 7 Thus, "production produces not only workers but
Americans, loyal and proud General Motors employees [for instance],
women, and gays and lesbians," 38 all of whom, as an essential part of their
identity as Americans, are expected to, and do, consume at least in equal
measure to that which they produce. Consumptive acts and behavior are
thus at once deeply constitutive and productive in nature. One gains so-
cial status from using a gold card, carrying shopping bags from exclusive
stores, and wearing brand names on the outside of your clothing. In late-
modem American society, a minority social group can claim that it has
achieved a level of social visibility, acceptance, and presence when it is
recognized as a niche market. The gay community, for instance, cele-
brated the fact that alcohol manufacturers, such as SKYY Vodka, began to
target the community in their marketing strategies. 39 Martina Navra-
tilova has been used by MasterCard in its advertisements to sell credit
cards to lesbians and gays under the notion that we are building commu-
34. Miranda Joseph does a nice job of elaborating the intellectual histories that have
undermined these binaries. See Joseph, supra note 25, at 25.
35. This view is not, of course, unique to Fineman. John Rawls has similarly framed
both the family and the social utility of reproduction:
The family is part of the basic structure, since one of its main roles is to be the
basis of the orderly production and reproduction of society and its culture from
one generation to the next .... [R]eproductive labor is socially necessary labor.
Accepting this, a central role of the family is to arrange in a reasonable and
effective way the raising of and caring for children, ensuring their moral
development and education into the wider culture .... The family must ensure
the nurturing and development of such citizens in appropriate numbers to
maintain an enduring society.
These requirements limit all arrangements of the basic structure, including
efforts to achieve equality of opportunity. The family imposes constraints on ways
in which this goal can be achieved, and the principles ofjustice are stated to try to
take these constraints into account.
John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 765, 788 (1997)
(citation omitted).
36. "Not only is the individual's identity formed/expressed in production but the
collectivity, social relations, are also determined through the mode of production."
Joseph, supra note 25, at 29 (discussing Karl Marx's essay, The German Ideology).
37. David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of
Cultural Change 125-26 (1990).
38. Joseph, supra note 25, at 26.
39. Alexandra Chasin, Selling Out: The Gay and Lesbian Movement Goes to Market
134-41 (2000).
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nity by making purchases with a rainbow credit card: "The Rainbow
card . . . promotes the idea that personal consumption is an effective
mode of political participation .... "40 Similarly, African Americans are
urged to build the Black community by buying Black. 4 1 Such examples
illustrate how consumption "become[s] the site and structure through
which the community enacts [and produces] its very existence." 42
Returning to Fineman's Porsche owner, if there is anything we have
learned as members of modern political economies, it is that consump-
tion is society-preserving work. On the other hand, while surely there is
social value to the reproduction of the species, I question whether "soci-
ety-preserving work" accurately or adequately describes how women actu-
ally experience the labor they are performing by having and raising chil-
dren. "Women have children because they love them or the idea of
them, to keep a marriage together, to meet social, spousal or parental
expectations, to experience pregnancy, or to pass on the family name,
genes, or silver." Professor Sanger continues, "[s]ometimes children are
conceived for the benefit of existing children: to keep someone from
being an only child,"4 3 or to provide bone marrow to a dying sibling.44
Indeed, I suspect that if polled, mothers would rank a species-regarding
reason well behind more private and personal motivations for their deci-
sions to reproduce. 45 A recent letter to the editor of the New Yorker noted
that "many adoptive families I know were driven not by an altruistic urge
but by a selfish desire to create a family."'46 To portray mothering as
purely altruistic, other-regarding, and socially valuable, and sports car
40. Id. at 198-99.
41. See Timothy Bates, Banking on Black Enterprise: The Potential of Emerging
Firms for Revitalizing Urban Economies 31-72 (1993);Jeremiah Cotton, Towards a Theory
and Strategy for Black Economic Development, in Race, Politics, and Economic
Development 11, 29-30 (James Jennings ed., 1992); Lateef Mtima, African-American
Economic Empowerment Strategies for the New Millennium-Revisiting the Washington-
Du Bois Dialectic, 43 How. L.J. 391, 429 (1999) ("African-Americans must restructure intra-
community attitudes to black enterprise. African-Americans must not merely 'buy black,'
but must also step up the effort to establish and support more black entrepreneurial and
professional endeavors."); Michael L. Moss, Harlem's Economic Paradox, N.Y. Times, Dec.
13, 1995, at A23 (discussing "buy black" sentiments at the root of fatal fire and commercial
landlord dispute on Harlem's 125th Street shopping strip); cf. Chasin, supra note 39, at
50-53 (analogizing "Buy Black" to "Buy Queer").
42. Joseph, supra note 25, at 44.
43. Sanger, M is for the Many Things, supra note 10, at 48.
44. See id. at 48-49 (citing Denise Hamilton, Woman Is Having Baby to Save Her
Ailing Daughter, L.A. Times, Feb. 16, 1990, at Al); Denise Grady, Son Conceived to
Provide Blood Cells for Daughter, N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 2000, at A24; Abigail Trafford, Brave
New Reasons for Mothering: Having a Baby to Produce a Potential Organ Donor, Wash.
Post, Feb. 27, 1990, at Z6.
45. "[P]oor people have children for the same reasons that other people have
children. All the data shows that people have children because they want companionship
or because children are valued in society." Martha Davis, Contemporary Challenges to
Gender Equality, 43 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 159, 171 (1999).
46. Barbara C. Boches, Letter, New Yorker, Aug. 14, 2000, at 5.
[Vol. 101:181
THEORIZING YES
ownership as purely selfish and socially inconsequential, is to ignore the
complex interrelations between production, reproduction, and consump-
tion,4 7 as well as the social forces that govern the "choices" and priorities
we set in our own lives. 48
What is more, even though there is an enormous public interest in
the labor performed by mothers-to the point that some feminist theo-
rists describe children as a public good 49 -children remain the private
property of their parents, which is an arrangement most feminists do not
find troubling. 50 The politics of public value, public subsidy, but private
accountability with respect to raising children is revealed to be quite para-
doxical under close examination. A recent cover story in the New York
Times Magazine profiled a family in the leadership of the home-schooling
movement. A large number of home schoolers are fundamentalist chris-
tian families who, according to the New York Times Magazine, "are no
longer fighting against the mainstream-they're 'dropping out' and cre-
ating their own private America."51 Many families, like the Scheibners
profiled in this article, are heeding the call of Paul Weyrich, a founder of
the Christian Right, to "drop out of this culture, and find places ...
where we can live godly, righteous, and sober lives." 52 Not coincidentally,
these families, and many others like them, are also making the loudest
demands for public subsidies or vouchers that will finance home-school-
ing as well as private, parochial school tuition for families that seek to
remove their children from the public school system. It must be worth at
least thinking about the carte blanche we give the privatized family to
refuse to teach "our" future citizens public norms of tolerance, equality,
47. See Joseph, supra note 25, at 29-38.
48. Francine Blau, Lawrence Kahn, and Jane Waldfogel have studied the economic
and social structures that incentivize or discourage young women's decisions regarding
when and whether to marry, concluding that labor market opportunities and education
have significant effects upon these choices. See Francine D. Blau et al., Understanding
Young Women's Marriage Decisions: The Role of Labor and Marriage Market Conditions,
53 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 624, 645 (2000).
49. See, e.g., Mary Becker, Patriarchy and Inequality: Towards a Substantive
Feminism, 1999 U. Chi. Legal F. 21, 73 ("Children are a public good benefiting the entire
community: we all benefit from having younger generations of workers, particularly as we
age."); Nancy Folbre, Children As Public Goods, Am. Econ. Rev., May 1994, at 86, 86
("[A]s children become increasingly public goods, parenting becomes an increasingly
public service.").
50. By contrast, some American Indian tribes treat children as belonging to more
than just their parents. See Barbara Ann Atwood, Identity and Assimilation: Changing
Definitions of Tribal Power Over Children, 83 Minn. L. Rev. 927, 963 n.152 (1999); see
also Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to
Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78
Geo. L.J. 459, 474 (1990) (describing collective approaches to parenting).
51. Margaret Talbot, A Mighty Fortress, N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 2000, (Magazine), at 34,
36.
52. A Moral Minority? An Open Letter to Conservatives from Paul Weyrich (Feb. 16,
1999), at http://freecongress.org/fcf/specials/weyrichopenltr.htm (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
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and humanity-or worse.5 3 The freedom to indulge such non-public, if
not anti-public, preferences in the raising of children can be quite alarm-
ing-especially when the public is called upon to finance the raising of
these future christian soldiers. 54 We have delegated to private parties the
task of producing and raising the next generation, and we have done so
in the absence of any public accountability for what kinds of people this
public service produces.
What also strikes me as worthy of examination is the degree to which
parenting is described as productive social activity while, in many regards,
parenting has become as much or more about consumption than produc-
tion. Sylvia Ann Hewlett, the founder of the National Parenting Associa-
tion, mused in a recent op-ed piece in the New York Times about how the
public fails to recognize the financial sacrifices that mothers make to
raise children.5 5 What with "therapy, summer camp, computer equip-
ment and so on,"5 6 kids are just darn expensive, she argued. The "and so
on" explicitly includes a "three-bedroom home" in her calculus, but
surely implicitly entails Pokfmon accessories, My Little Pony dolls,
Barbies, fancy sneakers, and other expensive articles of consumption that
are aggressively marketed to children these days. While I don't think that
children of any economic class should be deprived of the toys and other
items that bring joy into their lives, I am concerned about the bourgeois
framing of an issue that gives the larger public the tab for the marketing-
induced "needs" of children. And all in the name of "society-preserving
work." That children want things, or their parents wish to provide them
to their children, is an insufficient justification for shifting the costs of
those needs to the public. In other words, the framing of needs in the
language of rights is always problematic, but particularly so where needs,
such as those Hewlett asserts, are invoked so uncritically.
Finally, I have one last concern about the "we must reproduce the
species" response to my invitation to legal feminists to critically examine
repronormativity in society. Policies favoring reproduction are often jus-
tified by the need to create another generation of workers who will sup-
53. See id. ("What I mean by separation is, for example, what the home-schoolers
have done. Faced with public school systems that no longer educate but instead
'condition' students with attitudes demanded by Political Correctness, they have
seceded.").
54. The IRS has recently determined that a christian home-schooling organization
qualifies as a nontaxable charity. See IRS Exemption Rulings, 153 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA),
Aug. 8, 2000, at K-2 (Section 509 (a) (2)-Classification as Nonprivate Foundation Due to
Nature of Support). In May 1999, Senate Finance Committee Chairman William Roth
unveiled an education package that included education IRA withdrawals for qualified
education expenses associated with primary and secondary private schooling and certain
home-schooling. See Bud Newman, Tax Legislation: Roth Unveils Education Tax Break
Package; Cost of $7.6 Billion over 10 Years is Offset, 95 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), May 18,
1999, at G-4.
55. See Sylvia Ann Hewlett, Editorial, Have a Child, and Experience the Wage Gap,
N.Y. Times, May 16, 2000, at A23.
56. Id.
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port us in our old age.5 7 But these policies cannot be disaggregated from
immigration policy. The need to maintain a certain corps of tax-paying
workers could be met through manipulation of our immigration laws-as
we have done in the past to meet demand in particular sectors of the
economy.58 With the impending bulge in demand on the social security
system precipitated by the retirement of baby boomers, more than a few
policymakers have suggested that an increase in legal immigration for
higher-skilled workers will replenish the system during a period of exces-
sive demand.
Thus we see a convergence of interests among Silicon Valley execu-
tives in need of high-tech labor, immigrant rights groups advocating on
behalf of undocumented workers, and those concerned with the financial
future of Medicare and Social Security materializing in aggressive lobby-
ing to increase the available workforce. To encourage workers to come to
the United States, a recently enacted law increased the number of Hi-B
visas annually made available to skilled workers.5 9 To further bolster the
social security system, a proposed amnesty program legalizes the status of
numerous illegal immigrants, a measure that both facilitates more em-
ployers paying into the current social security system on behalf of their
presently employed workers and creates the sizable workforce necessary
to support the financial demands that the impending retirement of the
baby-boomers will generate. 60
57. See, e.g., Jane Rutherford, One Child, One Vote: Proxies for Parents, 82 Minn. L.
Rev. 1463, 1518 (1998) (describing children as "society's workers, tax-payers, and leaders"
and as "qualified workers who can contribute tax dollars toward tomorrow's needs").
58. Beginning in 1907, the federal government vested decisions with respect to the
admission of aliens in the Secretary of Labor. See Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch. 1134, 34 Stat.
898; see also Michael J. Churgin, Immigration Internal Decisionmaking: A View from
History, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1633, 1635 (2000) (reporting proposed legislation to increase
number of visas for skilled foreign workers); Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic,
California's Racial History and Constitutional Rationales for Race-Conscious Decision
Making in Higher Education, 47 UCLA L. Rev. 1521, 1550 (2000) (discussing the manner
in which Mexicans were admitted into the U.S. for migrant labor in California during a
period of acute labor shortage occasioned by the beginning of World War II); Marjorie
Valbrun, Renewed Bids for Visas for High-Tech Workers Reflect the Political Influence of
Silicon Valley, Wall St. J., Sept. 15, 1999, at A34 (noting expanded influence of Silicon
Valley in 2000 elections); Marjorie Valbrun & Glenn Burkins, Tight Labor Market Shifts
Immigration Debate, Wall St. J., Feb. 10, 2000, at A2 (discussing shortage of skilled workers
in high-tech industries and proposed legislation to raise immigration cap).
59. See, e.g., Lizette Alvarez, Congress Approves a Big Increase in Visas for
Specialized Workers, N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 2000, at Al (describing how "the bill's immediate
goal is to help high-tech companies recruit employees").
60. See The Economic Need for Immigration, Fin. Times, July 31, 2000, at 19; Julian
Simon, Cato Institute and the National Immigration Forum, Immigration: The
Demographic and Economic Facts (July 7, 1998), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/
policy.report/pr-imintro.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review). However, the
economic justification for opening up U.S. borders often takes a rather familiar turn when
advocates push for the "right" kind of immigrants-those who speak English, are of a
certain education and economic class, and can document that they will not become a
public charge. See Jodi Wilgoren, California and the West, Immigrants Are a Boon to
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The preference for natalist over immigration-based solutions to this
intergenerational support problem have often taken the form of loosely-
veiled racism, xenophobia, or decolonization. 61 In Israel, for instance,
the government has long-favored maternal policies that generously subsi-
dize Jewish women's maternity and childcare needs while actively discour-
aging Palestinian women's reproduction.6 2 Similarly, a government re-
port addressing France's slow population growth suggested that the
government allow greater immigration. This solution was dismissed out
of hand, as the French regarded their country already too full of foreign-
ers. (Multiculturalism has not been embraced by the majority of the
French people as a republican value. 63 ) Unlike the myth of the melting
pot in the United States, "immigrants have practically no place in the
French national memory."64 Instead, the government opted for very gen-
erous state subsidies to French women upon the birth of their second and
third child, accompanied by a tightening up of immigration laws, particu-
larly for Franco-Algerians and others from former French colonies.6 5 In
case there was any mistaking the motivation for France's aggressive natal-
ism, socialist President Francois Mitterrand explained that nationalism,
not socialism, justified his raising family benefits by twenty-five percent as
one of his first acts in office. 66
Economy, Study Says, L.A. Times, July 7, 1998, at A3 (citing a 1990-1991 study that showed
that two-thirds of the women giving birth in public hospitals and one in four federal
prisoners were undocumented).
61. See Etienne Balibar, Is There a 'Neo-Racism'?, in Etienne Balibar & Immanuel
Wallerstein, Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities 17, 21 (Chris Turner trans., Verso
ed. 1991) (1988) (conceptualizing "new racism" in France as "the reversal of population
movements between the old colonies and the old metropolises"); see also G6rard Noiriel,
Difficulties in French Historical Research on Immigration, in Immigrants In Two
Democracies: French and American Experience 66, 75 (Donald L. Horowitz & Gerard
Noiriel eds., 1992) (arguing that immigration policy, from as far back as 1789, was
motivated by "the preservation of the traditional national character... admit[ting] the
elements capable of assimilation and exclud [ing] the others .... [T] he leitmotif of French
political thought on immigration was that in order to preserve the identity of the French
people, a policy of ethnic selection must be applied." (citations omitted)).
62. See, e.g., Mimi Ajzenstadt &John Gal, Appearances Can Be Deceptive: Gender in
the Israeli Welfare State 15-18 (June 5, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (describing the "clear-cut desire on the part of Jewish decision-
makers to adopt a pro-natal policy to encourage Jewish, but not Arab, demographic growth
in the newly formed state").
63. See, e.g., Alec G. Hargreaves, Immigration, 'Race' and Ethnicity in Contemporary
France 176 (1995) (describing the reform of French nationality laws); The Missing
Children, Economist, Aug. 3, 1991, at 44 (explaining how the French have come to view
cultural differences as a negative rather than a positive feature of society).
64. Noiriel, supra note 61, at 66, 68.
65. See Hargreaves, supra note 63, at 169-76; Nancy L. Green, Le Melting-Pot: Made
in America, Produced in France, 86J. Am. Hist. 1188, 1197 (1999).
66. William Echikson, A Baby Boom, S'il Vous Plait!, Christian Sci. Monitor, Aug. 24,
1983, at 6. See generally Judy Scales-Trent, African Women in France: Immigration,
Family, and Work, 24 Brook. J. Int'l L. 705, 708-11 (1999) (describing the increase in
African, particularly African female, immigration into France).
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Unfortunately, U.S. immigration policy cannot boast of an absence
of racist underpinnings. Nineteenth-century immigration laws allowed
Chinese men to enter the United States only as laborers, denied entry to
Chinese women and children, and prohibited the laborers from inter-
marrying with non-Chinese women. 6 7 Such a policy isolated Chinese
workers so that they could devote their entire lives to their jobs and pre-
vented an undesirable group from reproducing.68 Despite our national
mythology of the United States as an ethnic melting pot, throughout the
nation's history arguments rooted in eugenics and other notions of racial
inferiority have been invoked in order to limit immigration and maintain
a particular conception of U.S. national identity.69
I raise these questions regarding the erasure of the normativity of
reproduction with a keen eye to the degree to which the paradigmatic
case in each of my examples is a white, middle-class woman. Women of
color and low-income women have struggled against overwhelming disin-
centives to reproduction,7 0 including the forced sterilization of African
American, Puerto Rican, and American Indian women, 7 1 and the re-
moval of children of color from their birth parents in order to place them
in white families. 72 Our national preference for a natalist solution to pre-
serve society assumes that the production of reproduction take place in
white, monied wombs. Similarly, my critique of the privatized family has
purchase largely, again, for white, middle-class families. People of color
and low-income people have always been vulnerable to intrusive interven-
tion by the state into their family lives. 73 The questions I raise must be
asked with these contexts in mind.
This is not to say that the concerns I suggest here have no relevance
to women of color and other women whose reproduction has been struc-
67. Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58, 59 (1882) (repealed 1943).
68. See, e.g., Bill Ong Hing, Making and Remaking Asian America Through
Immigration Policy, 1850-1990, at 45-46 (1993) (amply documenting the manner in
which U.S. immigration laws were explicitly designed to shape, limit, and manipulate
Chinese American, Korean American, and Japanese American identity).
69. See Desmond King, Making Americans: Immigration, Race, and the Origins of
the Diverse Democracy 166-95 (2000).
70. See, e.g., Dorothy Roberts, Killing the Black Body: Race, Reproduction and the
Meaning of Liberty 23 (1997) ("[Slavery] marked Black women from the beginning as
objects whose decisions about reproduction should be subject to social regulation rather
than to their own will.").
71. See generally Nancy Ehrenreich, The Colonization of the Womb, 43 Duke L.J.
492, 515 (1993) (detailing the involuntary sterilization of women of color through the
1970s who were sterilized because they were believed to be "sexually promiscuous and
either too irresponsible or too ignorant to use birth control"); Iris Lopez, Agency and
Constraint: Sterilization and Reproductive Freedom Among Puerto Rican Women in New
York City, 22 Urb. Anthropology & Stud. Cultural Sys. & World Econ. Dev. 299, 301-03
(1993) (reviewing incidence of sterilization abuse among Puerto Rican women in New
York City).
72. See, e.g., Linda Gordon, The Great Arizona Orphan Abduction 309 (1999).
73. See, e.g., Naomi R. Cahn, Models of Family Privacy, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1225,
1243 (1999).
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turally discouraged, if not prohibited. I hope these remarks will at least
problematize arguments made on behalf of reproductively disfavored wo-
men in which equality and fairness are figured as the restoration of the
repronormative privileges enjoyed by women who are not subject to race
and class bias-their "unproblematic" behavior is the baseline against
which we measure the extent of the bias suffered by women of color and
lesbians, for instance. We should be cautious about developing strategies
in which assimilation to a white, middle-class hetero/repro norm stands
for the absence of coercion, and the restoration of a non-biased natural
set of choices.
Surely public and private forces that discourage or stigmatize women
of color's reproductive behavior are worthy of strong opprobrium. The
data documenting fertility patterns of women in the United States, how-
ever, raises interesting questions regarding the presumed baselines that
distinguish coerced from freely-chosen reproduction. Notwithstanding
structural disincentives to reproduce, women of color are more likely
than white women to have children during their lifetime. For instance,
85.5% of Hispanic/Latina women bear at least one child by the age of 44,
as compared with 83% of African American and Asian American women,
and 80.5% of white, non-Hispanic women.7 4 So too, fertility operates in
inverse proportion to income and education.7 5 This data demonstrates
durable "preferences" to reproduce among women of color, women earn-
ing lower incomes, and less-educated women, but it tells us nothing about
the nature of those preferences. These numbers might suggest intracom-
munity critical, normative discussions regarding the primacy placed upon
reproduction. The unstated premise of much of the literature critiquing
policies and practices that discourage women of color's fertility is the be-
lief that more women would be reproducing in the absence of these
structural disincentives, presumably restoring fertility for Hispanic/La-
tina women to rates in excess of 90%. Might there be any grounds upon
which virtually universal motherhood by Latinas would garner critical at-
tention from critical race feminists? According to what theory of well-
being, equality, community, and flourishing would a cultural justification
or explanation for women of color's overwhelming reproduction be legit-
imate? Revealing the genealogy of a community norm that privileges
large families is surely an important project, but that genealogy does not,
standing alone, resolve the question of whether the community norm is
one worthy of preserving prospectively. To call it cultural should begin,
not end, our critical attention to this issue.
Another way to cast this concern is to ask: What social practices are
in need of explanation? Typically, only the deviant, perverse, disfavored,
or odd. You do not see biologists plumbing the human genome in search
of the "straight gene," nor do we worry that heterosexual kindergarten
74. Bachu & O'Connell, supra note 11, at 2 tbl.A.
75. Id. at 4 tbl.C.
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teachers will make little kids straight.76 The normativity of white, straight
middle-class women's repronormative behavior serves to set-off the les-
bian/Black/HIV-positive/infertile/disabled woman's predicament as a
marked deviation from the natural order.
It is a common feminist practice to rake a gender-based dragnet over
a problem and see what it turns up (glass ceilings, sexual harassment, sex
segregation at work, disproportionate amount of caretaking/domestic
work done by women at home). But it is also important, from time to
time, to take an interest in what it does not pick up (most women are
mothers, for instance), and ask why. When we peel away the artifice of
the naturalness of the unmarked category, sometimes we find a pay-off to
some or a price paid by others. These payments and prices may demand
a gender-based analysis-at least in part. My point here is to suggest that
legal feminism may benefit from exposing all women's reproduction to
this sort of scrutiny.
For these reasons, I hope legal feminists might consider the ways in
which repronormative forces affect women's child-bearing and raising
"choices," just as (hetero)sexuality has come to be understood as both
compulsory and ineluctably the product of heteronormative forces. In
understanding this project, feminists should not abandon a concern for
the role of reproduction and mothering in women's lives. Instead we
could stand to pay closer attention to the taken-for-grantedness of moth-
erhood in feminist legal theory. What is our stake in treating mother-
hood as a social position and a set of both expectations and entitlements
not worthy of the level of interrogation we have visited on other funda-
mental aspects of women's lives? Too few of us have taken this insight as
seriously as I believe Fineman intended it and challenged the baseline
that accepts motherhood as an inevitability in women's lives. What are we
missing by failing to do so?
II. GETTING STUCK IN "No"
Implicitly installing Lysistrada as the patron saint of feminism, for
many feminist legal theorists, saying no to sex has been understood as
one of the principal ways of saying yes to power.77 No to incest, no to
76. For a recent refreshing counterexample, see Gay Teacher's Disclosure Spurs a
Debate, N.Y. Times, June 11, 2000, at 36 (In response to parental uproar at a first-grade
teacher revealing to his students that his male partner would be "someone you love the way
your mom and dad love each other," the school superintendent responded: "Had the
teacher at that point said, 'I'm married and have two kids,' no one would have blinked an
eye. . . .There should not be a double standard for heterosexual and homosexual
teachers.").
77. The parallel of this strategy to that of Foucault is worth noting: "We must not
think that by saying yes to sex, one says no to power." 1 Michel Foucault, The History Of
Sexuality 157 (Robert Hurley trans., 1978). Part of Foucault's project in the first volume of
History of Sexuality was to critique a conception of sex as a natural drive that stands prior to
and outside of relations of power that regulate sexual behavior through organized
mechanisms of sexuality. My project in this Essay is to challenge feminist legal theory that
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rape, no to sexual harassment-the link between sex and women's op-
pression has been one of the fundamental insights of second-wave femi-
nism. 78 Thanks in no small part to the work of Catharine MacKinnon, 79
legal feminism can pride itself in having developed a comprehensive
analysis of the ways in which male domination of women is achieved by
sexual means. 80 MacKinnon's dominance in legal feminism can be attrib-
uted, in large measure, to the degree to which her description of wo-
men's oppression intuitively resonates with the experiences of many
women.
Because there is much about which MacKinnon is right, she cannot
be dismissed out of hand. However, the rightness of her project and the
degree to which she overstates her prescription leaves legal feminism in
an uncomfortable bind: "To the extent that MacKinnon over determines
male sexuality as violence, she under determines female sexuality as the
null set,"8 or worse, a terrain fully colonized by male power: "Sex feeling
good may mean that one is enjoying one's subordination; it would not be
the first time. '82 For MacKinnon, all gender is always already about sexu-
ality, and all sexuality is always already about gender. And both gender
and sexuality are entirely about women's subordination to men.83 Thus,
"no" is the only viable feminist answer to any sexual question.
1) neglects any positive theory of sexuality, 2) overdetermines all sexuality as always already
polluted by sexist, male power and therefore toxic to women, or 3) posits a positive
conception of sexuality that is the opposite of power.
78. See, e.g., Kathleen Barry, Female Sexual Slavery 194 (1979) ("Sex-is-power is the
foundation of patriarchy .... Institutionalized sexism and misogyny-from discrimination
in employment, to exploitation through the welfare system, to dehumanization in
pornography-stem from the primary sexual domination of women in one-to-one
situations.").
79. E.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified (1987) [hereinafter
MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified]; Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory
of the State (1989) [hereinafter MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State].
80. MacKinnon writes:
Gender socialization is the process through which women come to identify
themselves as sexual beings, as beings that exist for men .... According to this
revision, one "becomes a woman"-acquires and identifies with the status of
female-not so much through physical maturation or inculcation into
appropriate role behavior as through the experience of sexuality .... Women
and men are divided by gender, made into the sexes as we know them, by the
social requirements of heterosexuality, which institutionalizes male sexual
dominance and female sexual submission. If this is true, sexuality is the linchpin
of gender inequality.
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda for
Theory, 7 Signs 515, 531-33 (1982).
81. Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong With Sexual Harassment?, 49 Stan. L. Rev.
691, 741 (1997).
82. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified, supra note 79, at 218.
83. According to MacKinnon:
[A] theory of sexuality becomes feminist to the extent it treats sexuality as a
construct of male power-defined by men, forced on women, and constitutive in
the meaning of gender. Such an approach centers feminism on the perspective
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Of course, not all legal feminists have signed up for MacKinnon's
project; indeed she has as many critics as she has fans. Nevertheless, even
among MacKinnon's greatest critics, the objects of scrutiny in the legal
feminist landscape by and large remain those brought into view by MacK-
innon's frame. In this domain of legal feminism, sexuality is accounted
for not as reproduction and dependency, but as danger. Sexuality is
something that threatens from without. It is an exogenous colonizing
technology of our (women's) oppression, and is always to be examined
with a "feminist eye" to the special injury that sexual violence inflicts on
women. Thus, within much of legal feminism, when an objectionable
practice takes on a sexual character, it has achieved its most injurious
form. Assault is bad; rape is much worse. Workplace harassment is bad;
workplace sexual harassment is much worse.84 Emotional betrayal by a
spouse is bad; adultery is much worse. Exploitative working conditions
are bad; exploitative sex work is much worse. 85
Just as the specter of a domain of sexuality that is the excess over
bare procreation is erased by many legal feminists who theorize sex as
dependency, here we see any excess beyond sexual danger equally erased
by legal feminists who construct sex as something that is done to, not by,
women. On that ground, we witness the most aggressive calls from femi-
nists for the legal regulation of rogue sexuality, such as pornography,
prostitution, infidelity, sexual violence, and sexual predation. Might
there be reason for caution in the feminist impulse to exercise juridical
control over this excess?
While I might agree that some of this conduct is unquestionably wor-
thy of legal regulation and public condemnation, the feminist call for
greater legal sanctions for sexual violence risks playing into the hands of
those who regard human sexuality as something to be indulged in only
for the purposes of reproduction.8 6 The failure of legal feminists to artic-
ulate and press a viable positive domain of non-reproductive sexuality has
left such a domain overdetermined as either lesbian territory or the site
of surplus male sexuality that is in need of taming, if not excising alto-
of the subordination of women to men as it identifies sex, that is, the sexuality of
dominance and submission, as crucial, as fundamental, as on some level
definitive, in that process.
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pleasure under Patriarchy, in Theories of Human Sexuality
67-68 (James H. Geer & William T. O'Donohue eds., 1987).
84. Vicki Schultz has described this impulse in sexual harassment jurisprudence. See,
e.g., Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 Yale L.J. 1683, 1685-86
(1998) (describing how the law has come to privilege only sex-based harassment that is
sexual in nature).
85. See generally Beverly Balos & Mary Louise Fellows, A Matter of Prostitution:
Becoming Respectable, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1220, 1303 (1999) (calling for legal reform to
.undermine the degeneracy/respectability dichotomy that prostitution embodies").
86. The unfortunate congruence of feminist and radical right campaigns for the
regulation of pornography is the best example of this potentiality.
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gether, through juridical means.8 7 The overwhelming attention we have
devoted to prohibitions against bad or dangerous sex has obscured, if not
eliminated, a category of desires and pleasures in which women might
actually want to indulge.
Another aspect of this dynamic is revealed in the priority given to
arguments marshaled against certain forms of sexual violence against wo-
men. Rarely is the diminishment or marginalization of women's sexual
pleasure invoked as a reason, albeit one among others, to oppose particu-
larly odious social practices. Limitations on access to sexual education in
schools, as well as an absence of affordable contraception and abortion,
are targets of feminist criticism for a number of reasons. Yet, by and
large, the basis of the legal feminist demand for greater reproductive re-
sources has been grounded in the avoidance of dependency,88 or the im-
portance of women's autonomy or liberty. Indeed, some legal feminists
have framed the abortion issue as one that fundamentally involves ena-
bling men's sexual pleasure on the one hand, and women's exploitation
on the other.89 Women's right to enjoy their own body is entirely absent
87. An ironic implication of this tendency lies where legislatures have enacted laws to
address various types of male sexual transgression, but have done so in gender neutral
terms, thus exposing women to regulation by these same laws in equal degree. The legal
regulation of pornography, adultery, and domestic violence, for instance, has resulted in
the seizure of feminist and lesbian writings, see, e.g., Nadine Strossen, A Feminist Critique
of "The" Feminist Critique of Pornography, 79 Va. L. Rev. 1099, 1145-47 (1993)
(describing seizure of lesbian magazines and books under Canadian anti-pornography
law); enforcement of adultery laws against women, see, e.g., Bonura v. Bonura, 505 So. 2d
143, 145 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (granting divorce in favor of husband on grounds of wife's
adultery); Zeringue v. Zeringue, 479 So. 2d 443, 446 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (upholding
mutual fault divorce based on adultery by both parties); Armistead v. Armistead, No. 0614-
97-3, 1998 WL 37320, at *2-*3 (Va. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 1998) (confirming that adultery by
wife is grounds for divorce in husband's favor); Peyton v. Countryside Orthopaedics, P.C.,
No. 18157, 1999 WL 1417214, at *4 (Va. Cir. Ct. Oct. 8, 1999) (wife's adultery considered
important if contributing to divorce); and a steep rise in arrests of women pursuant to
mandatory arrest policies in domestic violence situations, see Linda G. Mills, Killing Her
Softly: Intimate Abuse and the Violence of State Intervention, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 550, 588
n.190 (1999).
88. See, e.g., Robin West, Caring forJustice 141-42 (1997) [hereinafter West, Caring
for Justice]; Robin West, Integrity and Universality: A Comment on Ronald Dworkin's
Freedom's Law, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1313, 1325 (1997) ("What Griswold and Eisenstadt
protected for both married and unmarried individuals was the freedom to engage in
heterosexual intercourse without fear of familial and reproductive consequences.").
89. This has been, in essence, Catharine MacKinnon's approach to the issue. See,
e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 Yale L.J. 1281,
1300 (1991) ("Women can have abortions so men can have sex."). Discussions with
Kendall Thomas brought this angle to my attention. Opposition to female genital cutting
is another excellent example of the sublimation of women's pleasure in the struggle to
eliminate sexist practices. Those who advocate for the elimination of these cuttings do so
on the grounds that these practices expose women to infection, are extremely painful, and
are likely to produce infertility or incontinence. The reduction, if not elimination, of
clitoral sexual pleasure is mentioned belatedly, if at all, by many of the activists who oppose
these practices. The effect that genital cuttings might have on a girl's capacity for sexual
pleasure was not once invoked as among the justifications for federal legislation
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in these feminist legal arguments. It has been the gay and queer legal
theorists who see these issues as about a "right to sex."90
I wonder if an intergenerational moment might have arrived when
we would want to de-sacrilize the sex-danger alchemy within feminist legal
theory-not to ignore the significance of sexual violence for women, but
instead to de-essentialize sex's a priori status as a site of danger for wo-
men and one best cleansed of such danger. An example may best illus-
trate the point. Some of us who teach sexual harassment law have begun
using a heuristic that excavates an interesting generational shift. I now
ask my students which practice they would find most humiliating, objecti-
condemning so-called "female genital mutilation." See, e.g., H.R. Rep. 103-501, at 10
(1994). The findings state that complications from FGM are common and include
immediate shock, bleeding, infection, and death as well as delayed medical problems such
as scarring, menstrual pain and blockage, pelvic and urinary tract infections, severe injury
and pain during intercourse, infertility, and difficulty with labor and delivery. There also
may be psychological complications since these painful rituals can be a source of extreme
emotional trauma.
Id. See also Introduction of Legislation to Prevent Female Genital Mutilation and the
Dangers of the National Security Revitalization Act, 141 Cong. Rec. H1695 (daily ed. Feb.
14, 1995) (statement of Rep. Schroeder) ("FGM causes serious health problems-
bleeding, chronic urinary tract and pelvic infections, build-up of scar tissue, and infertility.
Women who have been genitally mutilated suffer severe trauma, painful intercourse,
higher risk of AIDS, and childbirth complications."). Ali Miller and Carole Vance have
convinced me that Representative Schroeder and other Western or United Nations
feminists have downplayed or eliminated the pleasure argument from their advocacy
against female genital surgeries as a strategic matter. While this judgment may make sense
on real politik grounds, it does have the effect of perpetuating the erasure of women's
sexual pleasure as a significant human fights injury. Indeed, women do not have a human
right to the sexual enjoyment of their bodies, but only a right to freedom from infection
and pain. See Report of the World Conference of the U.N. Decade for Women: Equality,
Development and Peace, Copenhagen, July 14-30, 1980, at 34, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.94/35
(1980). Radhika Coomaraswamy, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Violence
Against Women, has framed women's sexual rights as fundamentally reproductive in
nature: "the issue of [women's] sexual rights... refers generally to a woman's control over
her sexuality and her access to primary and secondary health care and reproductive
technologies." Radhika Coomaraswamy, Reinventing International Law: Women's Rights
as Human Rights in the International Community, Edward A. Smith Lecture at Harvard
Law School (Mar. 12, 1996), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/HRP/
Publications/radhika.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review). Any excess over mere
reproduction is framed as an issue of concern to "the gay movement." Id. While
Coomaraswamy eloquently makes the case that female genital cutting is a violation of
women's human rights, she fails to regard the human rights issue raised by these practices
as relating to a limitation on women's sexual pleasure.
90. See David B. Cruz, "The Sexual Freedom Cases"? Contraception, Abortion,
Abstinence, and the Constitution, 35 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 299, 300-03 (2000); Richard
D. Mohr, Mr. Justice Douglas at Sodom: Gays and Privacy, 18 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 43,
83 (1986) ("[T]hough the Court has failed to acknowledge the logical conclusion to its
privacy decisions, [the Court] protect[s] the right to have sex."). Sylvia Law would be an
exception to this more general rule in recognizing and arguing for a right to sex on
feminist grounds. See, e.g., Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of
Gender, 1988 Wis. L. Rev. 187, 225 ("People have a strong affirmative interest in sexual
expression and relationships.").
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fying, or objectionable: having a male boss ask you, out of nowhere, to (i)
kiss him, (ii) babysit for his kids, or (iii) be responsible for serving coffee
at staff meetings. Few of my female students select the kiss as the most
objectionable encounter. When we discuss their reasons for their selec-
tions, 91 I cannot easily write off their failure to get the "right feminist
answer" to an impoverished feminist education or false consciousness.
Rather, sex seems to have become a less "dense transfer point for rela-
tions of [gender-based] power" 92 for some women a generation younger
than my feminist peers and I. This is not to say that sex no longer plays a
role in gender-based hierarchies, but rather, that we might want to reas-
sess the synergistic danger it presents today as compared with the period
in which we first formulated these analyses twenty years ago. Such a
generational shift highlights the fact that a feminist approach to sex and
sexuality must still simultaneously address the reduction of dangers we
face, the burdens of dependency, and the possibilities for women's exper-
iences of pleasure.
Surely legal feminists must remain committed to the idea that "sexu-
ality [is] not an unchanging biological reality or a universal, natural
force, but [is], rather, a product of political, social, economic, and cul-
tural processes."93 In other words, sexuality has a history. My concern is
that current feminist legal theory at times gives way to an impulse to
dehistoricize sexuality when we suture women's bodies to motherhood
and the inevitability of violence.
III. WHAT HAvE WE DONE?
In 1984, Gayle Rubin mused that feminism was best equipped to ana-
lyze and address gender-based subordination, and that a different dis-
course was needed to adequately analyze sexuality.94 From this observa-
tion, many believe,9 5 lesbian and gay, and then queer, theory was born.9 6
For example, the introduction to The Lesbian and Gay Studies Reader, pub-
91. Most students rate babysitting as by far the most objectionable, responding to the
greater offensiveness of maternal stereotyping over sex.
92. Foucault, supra note 77, at 103.
93. Kathy Peiss & Christina Simmons, Passion and Power: An Introduction, in Passion
and Power 3, 3 (Kathy Peiss & Christina Simmons eds., 1989).
94. See Gayle Rubin, Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of
Sexuality, in Pleasure and Danger 267, 307 (Carole S. Vance ed., 1984) ("Feminism is the
theory of gender oppression. To automatically assume that this makes it the theory of
sexual oppression is to fail to distinguish between gender, on the one hand, and erotic
desire, on the other.").
95. Ironically, Rubin is not among those who hold this belief. See Interview, Gayle
Rubin with Judith Butler, Sexual Traffic, in Feminism Meets Queer Theory 68, 73
(Elizabeth Weed & Naomi Schor eds., 1997).
96. Rubin's "Thinking Sex" is the first essay in The Lesbian and Gay Studies Reader
(Henry Abelove et al. eds., 1993). Eve Sedgwick's Epistemology of the Closet is widely
regarded as one of queer theory's early canonical texts. Here Sedgwick argued that the
question of gender and the question of sexuality are "not the same question, that in
twentieth-century Western culture gender and sexuality represent two analytic axes that
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lished some ten years later, claimed that "[l]esbian/gay studies does for
sex and sexuality approximately what women's studies does for gender.
9 7
Some theorists, both feminist and queer alike, have understood the paral-
lel evolution of feminist and queer theory over the last decade to be
grounded in the artifice that "the kind of sex that one is and the kind of
sex that one does belong to two separate kinds of analysis."
9 8
But surely it is a mistake to draw such a rigid distinction between acts
and identities, between who we want to be and whom we want to be with,
and between sex as adjective (that thing we are) and sex as verb (that
thing we do). To set up the analyses of gender and sexuality as separate
critical enterprises is to misread Rubin. Her point was not that issues of
sex and sexuality should be fully disaggregated from feminism, but rather
that she "wanted to be able to think about oppression based on sexual
conduct or illicit desire that was distinct from gender oppression (al-
though.., not necessarily unrelated or in opposition to it)."99 The wis-
dom imparted by Rubin in "Thinking Sex," that neither Marxism nor
feminism provided all the analytic tools we needed to adequately account
for sexuality-based oppression, does not mean that forever more these
two critical discourses should have nothing to say about the issue of sexu-
ality. Rather, "feminism's critique of gender hierarchy must be incorpo-
rated into a radical theory of sex, and the critique of sexual oppression
should enrich feminism."1 0 0
Despite such a challenge, most legal feminists seem to have lost a
taste for exploring the intersecting stakes that queer and feminist theory
have in fully theorizing questions of sexuality. The dependency or dan-
ger stance taken by most legal feminists when it comes to questions of
sexuality is a testament to the persuasive power of the structural material-
ism of theorists such as Catharine MacKinnon and Martha Fineman.
MacKinnon has rendered feminism the privileged site for analyzing sexu-
ality understood as danger by subordinating sexual politics to sex-based
subordination. 10 1 MacKinnon's "nearly metaphysically perfect" portrayal
of sexuality as always, already, and absolutely about gender-based subordi-
may productively be imagined as being distinct from one another as, say, gender and class,
or class and race." Eve Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet 30 (1990).
97. Henry Abelove et al., Introduction to The Lesbian and Gay Studies Reader, supra
note 96, at xv, xv.
98. Judith Butler, Against Proper Objects, in Feminism Meets Queer Theory, supra
note 95, at 1, 7. Butler, I must note, is not among the theorists who hold this view.
99. Rubin with Butler, supra note 95, at 96. Rubin says, "I was afraid that if there were
no independent analysis of sexual stratification and erotic persecution, well-intentioned
feminists and other progressives would support abusive, oppressive, and undeserved witch
hunts." Id. at 96-97.
100. Rubin, Thinking Sex, supra note 94, at 309.
101. See, e.g., MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified, supra note 79, at 218 (arguing that
.sexism is basic" and underlies sex); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of
Working Women: A Case of Sex Discrimination 178 (1979) ("Sexual harassment ... is
socially incarnated in sex roles."); MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State,
supra note 79, at 127 ("Male dominance is sexual.").
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nation and domination renders Rubin's demand for an analysis of sexual-
ity outside of gender not only irrelevant, but incomprehensible. On the
other hand, Martha Fineman has done an outstanding job of decoupling
relationships grounded in dependency from those grounded in sexual
desire, and in so doing has provoked a radical rethinking of mother-
hood. 102 In a sense, by framing the feminist project in gender-based
terms, MacKinnon has explicitly ruled in all sexuality as gender-based sub-
ordination, while Fineman has implicitly ruled it all out, preferring to set
her sights on gender and dependency constructed in asexual terms. But
too few of us, as legal feminists, have stepped in to re-theorize the signifi-
cance for women of non-reproductive intimacy, desire, and eroticism that
end up as the detritus of Fineman's work.
Is there sexuality beyond kinship that we could call feminist? If
Fineman pries open the possibility of non-reproductive sex or other inti-
mate relationships with someone or someones other than the person or
persons with whom one parents, what would be a feminist approach to
these erotic/intimate possibilities? What if we went all the way with
Fineman's suggestion, and declared women's sexuality to lie only in this
non-reproductive excess? 10 3 After all, this is the domain of the female
orgasm. We might want to explore, if only provisionally, what we might
gain if we disaggregated reproduction from sex, and treated them as two
distinct aspects of women's lives, potentially interrelated, but not necessa-
rily so. Perhaps it is time that we dust off our Shulamith Firestone.10 4
What might be the consequences of de-sexualizing kinship relation-
ships, not for kinship, which is Fineman's project, but for sexuality? Do
we run any risk of constructing women as de-sexualized dependency
workers who spend most of their intimate energies on runny noses and
very little on other more, er, adult body functions? Might we not want to
explore the necessary connections between the regulation of kinship/
family and the regulation of sexuality? Subsidies for reproduction surely
incentivize certain repronormative uses of the body, not to mention mar-
riage, monogamy, and the heterosexual family-all of which are methods
102. See, e.g., Fineman, Neutered Mother, supra note 26, at 8 ("I offer a utopian re-
visioning of the family-a reconceptualization of family intimacy that redefines the legal
core unit away from our current focus on sexual or horizontal intimacy.").
103. Sedgwick seems to lay claim to this excess as the rightful domain of queer theory:
"There is a powerful argument to be made that a primary (or the primary) issue in gender
differentiation and gender struggle is the question of who is to have control of women's
(biologically) distinctive reproductive capability." Sedgwick, supra note 96, at 28; see also
Biddy Martin, Sexualities Without Genders and Other Queer Utopias, 24 Diacritics 104,
107 (1994) ("Gender, and the theory of gender offered by feminism, then, are associated
[by Sedgwick] with reproduction and with women."). I want to resist a doctrinal boundary
dispute in which queer theory picks up where feminism leaves off, and the reproductive or
non-reproductive nature of the sexual activity is what separates a queer from a feminist
issue.
104. Shulamith Firestone, The Dialectic of Sex: The Case for Feminist Revolution
233-34 (1970) (arguing that the only means to achieve women's liberation is through the
technological separation of reproduction from the female body).
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by which our hedonic lives are tied to "proper" kinship formation favored
by the state.
In the absence of a robust cultural norm in which women's erotic
pleasure can be valorized and celebrated for its own sake, many women
feel they are faced with two rather undesirable choices when they con-
sider their own erotic desires separate from reproduction or as something
offered in exchange for domestic labor. They risk either being labeled
sluts or nymphomaniacs' 0 5 if they seek out sexual pleasure for its own
sake, or they face the dilemma described by Elizabeth Abbott in her new
book on the history of celibacy.' 0 6 She explains her own decision to be
celibate:
[C]elibacy has major tangible benefits, namely respite from the
time-consuming burdens of housewifery. . . .No longer do I
need to plan, shop for, cook, serve, and clean up after a week's
meals, or iron the shirts I once foolishly boasted I could do bet-
ter than the dry cleaner, or answer that infernal question
"Honey, where are my socks?" 107
Being a de-eroticized mother cannot be the only viable alternative to be-
ing a slut or celibate.
Men have almost entirely colonized the domain of sexuality that is
the excess over reproduction as for them and about them. Movies, adver-
tising, and fashion are largely projections of male fantasy-what would it
mean for women to appropriate some of this cultural excess? Just as we
have accepted that sexual orientation is not merely a natural phenome-
non, might we also want to explore the degree to which our passions,
fantasies, secret and not so secret desires are products of the world we live
in? Judith Walkowitz has observed that "[w] omen... do not simply expe-
rience sexual passion and 'naturally' find the words to express those feel-
ings."108 Rather, those things we experience as our own desires are
largely the product of a complex combination of external systems of so-
cial forces and internal personalized conventions residing in the
unconscious.109
Surely legal feminists would want to theorize the sexual nature of
human sexuality that is the "excess over or potential difference from the
bare choreographies of procreation."' 10 Is there a reason why we have
neglected to take notice of the fact that women are substantially more
likely to be unhappy about their sex lives than are men? Is there some-
thing that we, as legal feminists, should be doing to address the fact that
105. See Carol Groneman, Nymphomania: A History 121 (2000).
106. See Elizabeth Abbott, A History of Celibacy 429-30 (2000).
107. Id. at 429.
108. Walkowitz, supra note 6, at 9.
109. Teresa de Lauretis has written a lovely essay in which she elaborates a theory of
sexuality that draws in equal measure from Foucault's theory of social construction and
Freud's notion of the unconscious. See Teresa de Lauretis, The Stubborn Drive, 24
Critical Inquiry 851, 851-63 (1998).
110. Sedgwick, supra note 96, at 29.
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forty-three percent of women in the United States are suffering from
diagnosable sexual dysfunction, symptomized by a lack of interest in sex,
inability to achieve orgasm or arousal, and pain or discomfort during
sex?' 11
We have done a more than adequate job of theorizing circumstances
in which "no" is the right answer to a sexual encounter, but where are we
on the conditions under which we would be inclined to say "yes"? What
particular contribution can we as legal theorists make to these questions?
Why have we done such a meager job of thinking of the "sex issue" in
positive rather than negative terms, particularly compared with our sisters
in other disciplines?
Many feminist legal strategies presuppose men's sexuality as ever-
dangerous, and situate female sexuality as its opposite-a trap set, in part,
by the overwhelming heteronormativity of much of this feminist legal the-
orizing. Within this normative frame, one's desire runs in the opposite
direction of one's identity, and male and female identity are set up in
antinomous terms. Men desire women, their opposite, and that desire
takes a form that is good for them, and bad for us, empowers them, sub-
ordinates us, subjectifies them, objectifies us. Many feminist theorists
have taken up the project of using law to tame sexual danger, hoping to
leave in their wake a domain of safe sex, of love and intimacy in which
danger figures as sex's opposite. 112
Such a theory of the relationship between gender, sexuality, and sub-
ordination provides no satisfactory purchase on the question of women's
sexuality, except as to say that it amounts to the projection of violent male
desire. This conclusion is manifestly unappealing, for it leaves as its re-
mainder only three ways to affirmatively conceive women's desire once
liberated from the objectifying constraints of patriarchy: One, a mere
absence or void, best understood as the trauma or injury that male sexual-
ity leaves in its wake. Two, a warm, fuzzy, soft-focused cuddling1 13 not the
hot, steamy, edgy stuff that got us into trouble in the first place. Or three,
a desire that risks bumping up against danger. Feminist legal theory
often dismisses this last option as either false consciousness, or worse, wo-
men imitating male sexuality. But to evacuate women's sexuality of any
risk of a confrontation with shame, loss of control, or objectification
111. Edward 0. Laumann et al., Sexual Dysfunction in the United States: Prevalence
and Predictors, 281 JAMA 537, 540 (1999) [hereinafter Laumann et al., Sexual
Dysfunction] (finding that sexual dysfunction is more prevalent among women than men,
and is associated with age, race, and education).
112. See West, Caring for Justice, supra note 88, at 114-16 (arguing that women's
sexual pleasure is necessarily sacrificed in sexual relationships with men because of a fear
of violence); Mary Becker, Women, Morality, and Sexual Orientation, 8 UCLA Women's
LJ. 165, 191-203 (1998).
113. Michael Warner warns of sexual moralism that "too often paint[s] a sanitized,
pastoral picture of sex, as though it were simply joy, light, healing, and oneness with the
universe." Michael Warner, The Trouble with Normal: Sex, Politics, and the Ethics of
Queer Life 3 (1999).
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strikes me as selling women a sanitized, meager simulacrum of sex not
worth getting riled up about in any case.
Desire is not subject to cleaning up, to being purged of its nasty,
messy, perilous dimensions, full of contradictions and the complexities of
simultaneous longing and denial. It is precisely the proximity to danger,
the lure of prohibition, the seamy side of shame that creates the heat that
draws us toward our desires, and that makes desire and pleasure so resis-
tant to rational explanation. It is also what makes pleasure, not a contra-
diction of or haven from danger, but rather a close relation. These as-
pects of desire have been marginalized, if not vanquished, from feminist
legal theorizing about women's sexuality.
It bears noting that a soft-focused portrayal of female sexuality that is
set off against the hard-edged conception of male sexuality, as well as the
inclination to reduce questions of sexuality to matters of kinship or moth-
ering, mirrors the dominant account of female and male sexuality pro-
vided by traditional sexologists that has undergone rigorous critique by
feminist and queer sex researchers.' 1 4 According to Rebecca Young, the
view that predominated until less than twenty years ago characterized fe-
male sexuality as "romantic, non-genital, passive/responsive, monoga-
mous, and not open to autonomous expression. In this stereotype, the
normal woman is so chaste that her arousal can scarcely be termed sex-
ual, but is instead a purely emotional response: 'romantic longing." 11 5
The material Young examines reveals "[f] emale sexual desire and expres-
sion [is] not so much an end in itself as . . . a means for fulfilling other
needs and desires: love and motherhood."116
It cannot be right that feminists should leave to queer theorists the
job of providing an affirmative theory of sex that accepts and accounts for
the complex ways in which denial, shame, control, prohibition, objectifi-
cation, and power enable or capacitate desire and pleasure. Surely a
thick conception of gender, one that we would call feminist, should be
brought to bear on this project.
On the other hand, perhaps the place we find ourselves in legal femi-
nism reveals something more about our situation within law. Is it possible
that the task of theorizing yes is not one easily susceptible to the analytical
tools legal theory provides? Or have we, despite our frequent protesta-
tion to the contrary, 1 7 fallen victim to the myopia of which our discipline
114. For a recent sustained critique, see Rebecca Marie Young, Sexing the Brain:
Measurement and Meaning in Biological Research on Human Sexuality 251-99 (2000)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
115. Id. at 260.
116. Id. at 253.
117. See, e.g., Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 Mich. L. Rev.
2271, 2279 (1990); Mary E. Becker, The Politics of Women's Wrongs and the Bill of
"Rights": A Bicentennial Perspective, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 453, 456 (1992); Patricia J.
Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 Harv.
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 401, 405 (1987).
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in general suffers: thinking of rights and liberties primarily in negative
rather than positive terms?118 If this is the cause, at least in part, of legal
feminism's failure to take on the simultaneous projects of negative and
positive sexual liberty, what would that positive project look like?
Perhaps we face an opportunity to drag the feminist net over particu-
lar areas of law and see how a gendered construction of sexuality plays
out. Take tort damages, for instance. Men are more than twice as likely
to plead sexual dysfunction as a basis for money damages in personal
injury claims than are women." 9 In some cases, courts are more willing
to reward the physical disfigurement of women than their loss of sexual
pleasure.1 20 The recent study of sexual dysfunction among women found
that there are a substantial number of women who have suffered loss of
sexual desire and satisfaction as a result of various trauma.12' That injury
has been rendered invisible in tort law. Particularly given that we are now
living in the Viagra years, it would behoove us as legal theorists to pursue
strategies that would elevate women's sexual pleasure to the same level as
that enjoyed by men. While women's rights advocates fought hard in
Congress and in the courts122 to have reproduction count as a major life
activity in the Americans with Disabilities Act, what are the implications of
this statutory preference, and the arguments we have made in its support,
for women's non-reproductive sexuality? Women's sexual pleasure is not
currently recognized in law as a major life activity.
As cultural practices, our legal practices produce legal and social sub-
jects. We, the feminist legal theorists, must remain attentive to the dan-
gers of pursuing modes of analysis and argument that suffer from a kind
of theoretical phototropism that has amply nourished a theory of sexual-
ity as dependency and danger at the expense of a withering positive the-
ory of sexual possibility. Given the well-known dangers that lie in the
substantive legal regulation of sexual pleasure,1 23 it may be that the best
we can aspire to, as feminist legal theorists, is a set of legal analyses,
frames, and supports that erect the enabling conditions for sexual plea-
sure. If that modest work is the best we can expect from law, that still
leaves us much work to be done.
118. See, e.g., Elizabeth Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives
from the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 589, 590-93 (1986).
119. This observation is based upon my less-than-scientific survey of personal injury
actions over the last ten years.
120. See, e.g., Hammer v. Township of Livingston, 723 A.2d 988, 992 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1999) (concluding that plaintiff's allegation of loss of regular sexual relations is
not a "substantial" loss of a bodily function).
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